By: Zac Frederick
Title: George Washington’s Farewell Address
Author: George Washington
Date of Origin: September 19, 1796
The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the Office to which your Suffrages have twice called me,[1] have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty, and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire.[2] I constantly hoped, that it would have been much earlier in my power,[3] consistently with motives, which I was not at liberty to disregard,[4] to return to that retirement, from which I had been reluctantly drawn.[5]
…
The alternate domination of one faction over another,[6] sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissention,[7] which in different ages & countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism.[8] But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism.[9] The disorders & miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security & repose in the absolute power of an Individual:[10] and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction more able or more fortunate than his competitors,[11] turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty.[12]
…
In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that permanent inveterate antipathies against particular Nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded;[13] and that in place of them just & amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated.[14] The Nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave.[15] It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.[16] Antipathy in one Nation against another–disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur.[17] Hence frequent collisions, obstinate envenomed and bloody contests. The Nation, prompted by ill will & resentment sometimes impels to War the Government, contrary to the best calculations of policy.[18] The Government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject;[19] at other times, it makes the animosity of the Nation subservient to projects of hostility instigated by pride, ambition and other sinister & pernicious motives.[20] The peace often, sometimes perhaps the Liberty, of Nations has been the victim.[21]
…
‘Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent Alliances, with any portion of the foreign World–[22]So far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it–for let me not be understood as capable of patronising infidelity to existing engagements,[23] (I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy)–[24]I repeat it therefore, Let those engagements. be observed in their genuine sense.[25] But in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.[26]
Annotations:
[1] George Washington served as our nation’s first president from April, 1789 until March, 1797. This period of two terms set an obvious historical precedent for many presidents to come, and would later be added as law in the 22nd amendment to the United States Constitution. (Previdi 132). However, there exists great speculation on weather the refusal of a third term was Washington’s desire to set a precedent, or his attempt to avoid further public life and retreat to his dwellings in Mt. Vernon. This sentiment is expressed numerous times throughout his Farewell Address. (Fess 122).
[2] While detailing his reasoning thus far, this passage also describes a sentiment that sheds light on Washington’s leadership style. In almost every aspect, Washington was described as methodical, one who always wished to be informed, and additionally, one who desired to have the final say in all major decisions. In the words of Washington himself, “[s]ystem to all things is the soul of business. To deliberate maturely and execute promptly is the way to conduct it to advantage” (Greenstein 376).
[3] Washington very explicitly notes that two terms was never the ideal – he wished to retire from public service at a much earlier date. He even considered writing a farewell address as early as May, 1792, when he wrote a correspondence to Madison requesting “I will without apology desire that you will turn your thought to a valedictory address from me to the public” (Fess 122).
[4] In addition, Washington defends his decision to retire by noting the “inferiority” of his qualifications for president prior in the address. As ironic as this may seem as we evaluate this document in the present day, it does demonstrate how such an opening to the Address can be described as more about the “decisionmaker than the decision,” as we gain insight to the person behind the manuscript, rather than simply policy suggestions. Also given by Washington as reasons for his desire for retirement are the “weight of years” and that in his words “a very fallible judgement was present” (Spalding 67).
[5] At age 64 at the time of the publishing of his Farewell Address, Washington had spent 45 years in the service of his country. Because of this he wanted to return to a more private and secluded life at his estate in Mt. Vernon. This address served as his final communication to the people. (Fess 122). Following his correspondence to Madison following his first term, Washington received Madison’s reply in late June, urging him to make “[o]ne more sacrifice, severe as it may be, to the desires and interests of your country” (Mott 344).
[6] Professor Fred Greenstein describes the rise of the first party system in America as a result of policy differences between Jefferson and Hamilton: “Hamilton’s advocacy of a strong central government to acted to foster commerce and industrial development was reflected in the programs of the aptly named Federalist party. Jefferson support for a Decentralized agrarian republic and his fear of tyranny was the ideological basis of the Democratic Republican party” (Greenstein 377).
[7] Washington might not have realized that perhaps this warning came all too late – even this address would serve as a divide between the two parties forming in regards to authorship. As Federalists derived legitimacy as a party from the successes of Washington, rumors of Hamilton crafting the Address could have very well upset their claim of being the party of Washington, as Hamilton was not favorable due to many opposing his financial plan among other factors. (Malanson 222). The Address was considered to be the “sword and shield” of the Federalist party, and when a copy of the address was found in Hamilton’s own handwriting following his death, this challenged Washington as the legitimate author. (Malanson 223). However, Hamilton on the matter remarked that “the draft was susceptible of improvement … the best way was to leave the draft untouched and to write a new draft” (Mott 398).
[8] Formed in 1789, the Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution were possibly one faction that Washington had reviewed the effects of when he gave this warning. Led by Maximilien Robespierre among others, the Jacobin Clubs are largely known for instituting the Reign of Terror in the Revolution, comprised of countless executions of perceived enemies of the state.
[9] The president really did believe this notion that parties would be the demise of the Republic,, and once told Hamilton that if partisanship continued, he did not see “how the Reins of government are to be managed, or how the Union of the States can be much longer preserved” (Smelser 463).
[10] The nature of parties is that of revenge, and counter-revenge. Seeing this, men have no choice but to fall in line with one faction, and the cycle continues. In relation to the infamous Whiskey Rebellion, occuring after a brief insurrection of farmers most annoyed with a new whiskey tax, Federalists blamed the entire ordeal, including the uprising of farmers, their arrest, sentencing and pardoning, on the Democratic-Republican party. Washington in his annual speech to Congress implied that individuals had no right to associate themselves for political action: “The arts of delusion were no longer confined to the efforts of designing individuals… certain self created societies assumed the tone of condemnation” (Smelser 463).
[11] In Madison’s Federalist 10 written in 1787, he gives a similar warning in regard to factions. He argues that factions are part of human nature, “Individual’s opinions and passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves” (Federalist 10). He argues that minority interests in factions “clog the administration and convulse the society,” while majority interests he argues pose dangers both to the public good and to private rights (Rosenbloom S22).
[12] Tensions throughout the newly formed government were so high that when one ex-Senator once remarked that the government of the time was corrupt, Fisher Ames, a Representative, noted that “I wish the crackbrain could be convicted for libelling the government” (Smelser 463). Even in these early stages of the government, the rise of factions had already begun to demonstrate frightening characteristics, in this example hoping to squash the liberty of speech of an opposing faction for one’s own personal gain. This notion is what scared Washington, and what he warns us about in this Address.
[13] As a strict believer in individual morality, Washington here ascribes this personal concept of morality in warning against the formation of any permanent rivalries. Washington noted that proper conduct elevates national character: “the experiment as recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature” (Spalding 70). His subsequent argument details a national perspective for avoiding these entanglements.
[14] While his argument for a neutral America in a contentious world sounds morally upstanding in that the United States should develop amicable feelings towards all other nations, perhaps this ideal was not exactly naive, but rather too idealistic. One needs only to look to the present day for evidence of how such desires never came to fruition; while the United States presently strives for such relationships, in actuality this is not always the outcome – desired or not. What Washington fails to account for is that in foreign policy, the United States is not always the singular dependent variable.
[15] Context is incredibly important when evaluating the realities of Washington’s advice. As Hartmann and Wendzel acknowledge, Washington “was well aware that the United States, although free, was a weak, debt ridden, almost friendless nation . . . [it] no reliable friends, and it had more potential enemies than it could handle.” They argue that it makes sense that the United States had to “minimize the enmity it confronted, avoid unnecessary sought involvement, parry any aggressive initiatives from abroad, and avoid all confrontations with major nations” (Frederick 54).
[16] Washington was not alone in his sentiments – Thomas Paine’s Common Sense in 1776 expressed that “Tis the true interest of America, to steer clear of European contentions, which she never can do, while by her dependence on Britain, she is made to make weight in the scale of British politics.” In 1777 John Adams had similar thoughts: “I do not love to be entangled in the politics of Europe” (Bemis 260). Washington was not unique in this sentiment.
[17] A key event related to the neutrality of America in the European wars was Jay’s Treaty. As the British navy seized 250 American ships carrying French goods, Washington sent John Jay to create a treaty. What he returned with acknowledged Britain’s right to seize the ships, and was seen widely as too conciliatory to the British regime. However, it was ratified in the Senate and it demonstrated the availability of diplomacy given the United States’ neutral stance (Henretta 200).
[18] Washington’s application of this principle through the Proclamation of Neutrality regarding Britain and France’s war gave America a serious competitive advantage in regard to the sugar trade. By avoiding the support of one particular side, American firms were allowed to sail through Britain’s naval blockade of France’s ports, and take over the lucrative sugar trade industry. Earnings averaged twice that of cotton and tobacco exports – around $20 million annually. (Henretta 199).
[19] Luckily the early government was able to avoid blindly passionate entanglements in the case of Robespierre and the Jacobins. When wealthy citizens condemned Robespierre for executing King Louis XVI and over 3,000 aristocrats in the reign of terror, American neutrality alienated none, and perhaps even led to a more peaceful outcome from the Whiskey Rebellion, as the United States had no formal alliances with the regime responsible for the executions (Henretta 199).
[20] It is important to remember that contextually, France had been, just eight years prior, America’s greatest ally in winning the Revolutionary War. In the span of one president, the foreign policy of an entire nation had shifted from pro-French to neutral under Washington. While the French believed that many of the American people were still pro-French, they sought to use this to their advantage and arouse their “allies.” A dangerous prospect for the US government, this was stifled in a sense by American neutrality. (DeConde 642).
[21] Quite literally, peace could have been at jeopardy when, as the result of the ratification of the Jay Treaty, French diplomat Pierre Auguste Adet saw “the overthrow of Washington and his Federalist administration as the only salvation” for pro-French influence (DeConde 643). Of course, Adet was unaware that Washington would step down shortly later following the completion of his second term. However, one can only wonder as to what could have come of this contention had Washington remained in power, or the timing been different.
[22] On the flip side, Washington doesn’t want to just steer clear of making foreign enemies, but he also warns against alliances. While this might not be the most intuitive response, given the geopolitical climate of the time the decision becomes very reasonable. With France as one of the most important political alliances America during the revolution, Washington reverses expectation and warns against all foreign alliances, including with the French.
[23] Washington relays that existing arrangements already in effect will be upheld. An interesting contention was that of the 1778 Franco-American treaty promising the French military support should a fight break out between Britain and France. Technically, the treaty was still in effect indefinitely (until it’s absolution in 1800), however the United States had nullified the treaty following Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality and subsequent Neutrality Act of 1794. This is one of the supporting reasons many were so enraged over the signing of Jay’s Treaty.
[24] While not on display in these specific excerpts, extremely notable to George Washington was his quality of honesty. While many have discussed the validity of the story of Washington chopping down the cherry tree at a young age, the fact remains that Washington was an incredibly honest man. In his own words: “I hope I shall possess firmness and virtue enough to maintain what I consider the most enviable of all titles, the character of an honest man.”
[25] Washington repeats this principle adding emphasis to it’s importance; while he urges the United States to remain neutral in foreign affairs, his character dictates that previous engagements will remain upheld. Though already described, Washington felt this extension of his character was important enough to repeat, and adds to the credibility of his point.
[26] It is interesting that following the definitive argumentative style he previously enacted, Washington boils down his suggestion to being merely an “opinion” as he notes. Washington’s presidency faced unprecedented challenge – quite literally. From the rise of factions and the Whiskey Rebellion, to the tensions and war between France and Britain. This Farewell Address provides Washington’s advice after his two terms as president.
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