## The Price of Anarchy in Series-Parallel Network Congestion Games

Bainian Hao, Carla Michini

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Network Congestion Games

- $N$ players
- An $(s, t)$-network $G=(V, E)$
- $\forall$ player $i$, strategy set $X^{i}=\mathcal{P}$, the set of all $(s, t)-$ paths.
- Set of states of the game $X=X^{1} \times \cdots \times X^{N}$
$\bullet \forall e \in E$ a nondecreasing delay function $d_{e}(x)=a x+b, a, b \geq 0$.
- Each state $\left(p^{1}, \ldots, p^{N}\right) \in X$ induces an $(s, t)$-flow of value $N$ in $G$. - The cost of a flow $g$ is $\operatorname{cost}(g)=\sum_{e \in E} g_{e} d_{e}\left(g_{e}\right)$.
- The cost of a path $p$ in $G$ w.r.t. $g$ is $\operatorname{cost}_{g}(p)=\sum_{e \in p} d_{e}\left(g_{e}\right)$.
- The augmented cost of a path $p$ in $G$ w.r.t. $g$ is $\operatorname{cost}_{g}^{+}(p)=\sum_{e \in p} d_{e}\left(g_{e}+1\right)$.
- A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) is a state $\left(p^{1}, \ldots, p^{i}, \ldots, p^{N}\right)$ inducing flow $f$ such that, for each $i \in[N]$ we have
$\operatorname{cost}_{f}\left(p^{i}\right) \leq \operatorname{cost}_{g}\left(\tilde{p}^{i}\right) \quad \forall\left(p^{1}, \ldots, \tilde{p}^{i}, \ldots, p^{N}\right) \in X$ inducing flow $g$.
- A social optimum (SO) is a state inducing a flow $o$ of minimum cost.
- The price of anarchy (PoA) is the ratio of cost of the most expensive PNE and cost of the SO.


## Series Parallel Networks

An $(s, t)$-network is series-parallel if it consists of either a single edge $(s, t)$ or of two series-parallel networks composed either in series or in parallel.


Given a PNE flow $f$ and a social optimum flow $o$, we consider the flow $o-f$. When $G$ is series-parallel, $o-f$ contains only internally disjoint cycles (Fotakis, 2010). The set of cycles of $o-f$ is denoted by $\mathcal{C}$. For each cycle $C_{i} \in \mathcal{C}$, we denote define two paths $C_{i}^{-}$and $C_{i}^{+}$, where $C_{i}^{-}$ contains edges where $f_{e}>o_{e}$ and $C_{i}^{+}$contains edges where $f_{e}<o_{e}$.

| Main result |
| :--- |
| Theorem 1. $\quad$ The price of anarchy of series-parallel network con- <br> gestion games with affine delay functions is at most 2. |

- The PoA of network congestion games with affine delay functions has a tight upper bound of $5 / 2$ (Correa et al., 2019).
- On extension-parallel networks, a subclass of series-parallel networks, network congestion games with affine delay functions have a tight upper bound of $4 / 3$ (Fotakis, 2010). However, this bound cannot be extended to series-parallel networks.

Proof of Theorem 1
We define $\Delta(f, o):=\sum_{C_{i} \in \mathcal{C}} \operatorname{cost}_{f}\left(C_{i}^{-}\right)-\sum_{C_{i} \in \mathcal{C}} \operatorname{cost}_{f}^{+}\left(C_{i}^{+}\right)$.
For affine delays, it holds:

$$
\operatorname{cost}(f) \leq \operatorname{cost}(o)+\frac{1}{4} \operatorname{cost}(f)+\Delta(f, o)
$$

Main Lemma. In a series-parallel network congestion game with affine delay functions, we have $\Delta(f, o) \leq \frac{1}{4} \operatorname{cost}(f)$.
Using the main lemma, we get that $\operatorname{cost}(f) \leq 2 \operatorname{cost}(o)$, which implies PoA $\leq 2$.

The Greedy Decomposition
Given a flow $g$ and an edge costs vector $c \in \mathbb{R}^{|E|}$, where $c_{e}=d_{e}\left(g_{e}\right)$, we compute a greedy decomposition $\bar{P}(g)=\left\{\bar{p}^{1}, \ldots, \bar{p}^{N}\right\}$ of $g$ as follows:

- Set $g_{1}=g$, let $E_{1} \subseteq E$ be the edges with positive flows.

At each step:

- Compute the $(s, t)$-path $\bar{p}^{i}$ in $\left(V, E_{i}\right)$ with highest cost w.r.t. $c$.
- Decrease the flow $g_{i}$ by 1 on all the edges that belong to $\bar{p}^{i}$ to define $g_{i+1}$ and $E_{i+1}$.


Properties of the Greedy Decomposition
Let $P=\left\{p^{1}, \cdots . p^{N}\right\}$ be a decomposition of $f$ and $x \in \mathbb{R}$. Define

$$
R(P, x):=\sum_{i}^{N} \max \left\{0, \operatorname{cost}_{f}\left(p^{i}\right)-x\right\} .
$$

Let $\bar{P}=\bar{P}(f)=\left\{\bar{p}^{1}, \cdots \cdot \bar{p}^{N}\right\}$ be a greedy decomposition of $f$.
(1) $\operatorname{cost}_{f}\left(\bar{p}^{i+1}\right) \geq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j=1}^{i} \frac{\operatorname{cost}_{f}\left(\bar{p}^{j}\right)}{i}$ for $i \in[N-1]$.
(2) For any $x>0$, we have $R(\bar{P}, x) \geq R(P, x)$.

By these properties, we can show that when $\mathcal{C}$ contains only $(s, t)$-cycles:

$$
\Delta(f, o) \leq R\left(\hat{P}, \frac{\operatorname{cost}(f)}{N}\right) \leq R\left(\bar{P}, \frac{\operatorname{cost}(f)}{N}\right) \leq \frac{1}{4} \operatorname{cost}(f) .
$$

Where $\hat{P}$ is a decomposition containing all the paths $C_{i}^{-}$.
Extension to General Case
We show that $\Delta(f, o) \leq R\left(\bar{P}, \frac{\operatorname{cost}(f)}{N}\right)$ also holds for the case when there are some $C_{i}$ are not from $s$ to $t$.

- Define $\Delta(\mathcal{H}, f):=\sum_{C_{i} \in \mathcal{H}} \operatorname{cost}_{f}\left(C_{i}^{-}\right)-\sum_{C_{i} \in \mathcal{H}} \operatorname{cost}_{f}^{+}\left(C_{i}^{+}\right)$. Note that this definition works for any set $\mathcal{H}$ of cycles. When $\mathcal{H}=\mathcal{C}$, we have $\Delta(\mathcal{C}, f)=\Delta(f, o)$.
- Assume that $G$ is composed in parallel by $G_{1}, \cdots, G_{k}$.

We repeatedly apply a network shrinking operations to construct a network $\hat{G}$, a PNE flow $\hat{f}$ and a set of cycles $\hat{\mathcal{C}}$, such that $\frac{\Delta(\hat{\mathcal{C}}, \hat{f})}{\operatorname{cost}(\hat{f})} \geq \frac{\Delta(\mathcal{C}, f)}{\operatorname{cost}(f)}$.

- Pick a parallel component $G_{i}$ who contains a non- $(s, t)$ cycle.
(2) $G_{i}$ must be composed in series by two series-parallel subnetworks, we shrink one of them to get $\hat{G}$.
(2) Scale the delay functions of $\hat{G}$ using parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$.
(1) Update $\hat{\mathcal{C}}, \hat{f}$ according to $\hat{G}$.

At the end, all the cycles in $\hat{\mathcal{C}}$ are from $s$ to $t$. Then we can conclude:

$$
\frac{\Delta(f, o)}{\operatorname{cost}(f)}=\frac{\Delta(\mathcal{C}, f)}{\operatorname{cost}(f)} \leq \frac{\Delta(\hat{\mathcal{C}}, \hat{f})}{\operatorname{cost}(\hat{f})} \leq \frac{1}{4} .
$$


(i)

(ii)

$d_{c}\left(f_{e}\right) \forall e \in E\left(\hat{G} \backslash \hat{G}_{1}\right)$

