Abstract
In this article, we analyze a network inspection game in which two players, an attacker and a defender, coordinate multiple resources across a discrete set of locations. Specifically, the attacker chooses multiple components within a network to target, while the defender chooses a subset of disjoint collections of components to position detectors. However, the detection technology utilized is assumed to be fallible: efficacy of a detector is assumed to attenuate across the components of the network with respect to some metric (e.g. distance) based on technology utilized and network properties, resulting in successful detection probabilities being both location-and component-specific. The defender (respectively, attacker) aims to minimize (respectively, maximize) the expected number of attacks on the network that go undetected. We solve this large-scale zero-sum game by a) computing an analytical solution for a mixed-strategy Nash (or saddle-point) equilibrium, and b) provide intuition behind player strategies and decisions in equilibrium by highlighting components and quantities of importance to the players, introducing concepts of saturation and critical detection performance. We show how these results can be leveraged to influence decisions on what types of detection technology to purchase.